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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE INTENT
BEHIND THE TREATY POWER
By PeterL. Fitzgerald*
Growth of the Executive Agreement in United States
Foreign Policy
Throughout the history of the United States, the use of the executive agreement, in place of the treaty as a means of concluding formal
arrangements with foreign countries and organizations, has increased
dramatically.' As shown here, this development was not envisioned by
the authors of the Constitution, and evades the process they established
for the creation of binding obligations between foreign entities and the
government of the United States. This situation is a subject of great concern to some members of Congress, and this note submits that it represents an unconstitutional expansion of the authority vested in the executive branch.
An executive agreement is distinguished from a treaty in that it
does not require the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the Senate
under Article II of the United States Constitution.2 Some contend that
this is the only difference between the two;3 however, the Department of
State has recognized implicitly that the two instruments are not interchangeable. 4 "Executive agreement" is a vague term applied to three
types of agreements concluded without Senate approval under Article H.I
It applies to agreements entered into by the president under congressional
* Member, second year class.
1. See generally Hopson, The Executive Agreement in United States Practice, 12
A.F. JAG L. REv. 252 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hopson].
2. "He [the president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur
....
" U.S. CONST. art. IZ § 2.
3. See, e.g., McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executiveor Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1-2), 54 YALE

L. 181 (1945) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Lans], arguing that executive agreements and treaties are identical.
4. Hopson, supra note 1, at 255. Hopson cites State Department publications
which state that an executive agreement should not be used where a treaty is more appropriate.
5.

See generally 1 D. O'CONNELL, InternationalLaw 206 (2d ed. 1970) [herein-

after cited as D. O'CoiNnLL].
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authorization,0 such as the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934,"
the Lend-Lease Act of 1941,8 and the statute authorizing United States
membership in the International Labor Organization." Secondly, the
president may conclude an executive agreement under authority granted to him by a formal treaty; 10 for example, the agreements made pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945.11 Finally, executive agreements may be concluded under the sole constitutional
authority of the president, such as President Wilson's Lansing-Ishii
Agreement with Japan in 1917 and the exchange of notes that initiated
2
the "open door" policy in China.1
The range of subjects covered by these agreements is vast. One
author has reported that executive agreements have been utilized for
affiliation with international organizations, establishment of military
missions, collective security and status of forces arrangements, military
occupation and civil affairs, commercial aviation, communication satellites, weather stations, lend-lease settlements, guaranty of private investments, and development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.' 8 The impact of the executive agreement on the conduct of United States foreign
relations is best appreciated when this breadth of subject matter is
compared with the increasing use of executive agreements as a foreign
policy tool.
In the first half century of this country's existence, the United States
was a party to sixty treaties and only twenty-seven published executive
agreements.' 4 Prior to World War II the United States was a party to
approximately eight hundred treaties and twelve hundred agreements, a
ratio of 1.5 agreements for each treaty.' 5 Since World War II that ratio
has changed drastically, climbing to forty-five executive agreements for
every treaty during the 85th Congress and settling to an average of seventeen agreements for every treaty by 1968.18 These figures only apply
to published agreements, so the actual ratio might be far in excess of
6. But cf. Wright, The United States and International Agreements, 38 Am. J.
341, 342 n.4.2 (1944).
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (1934).
8. Act of Mar. 11, 1941, ch. 11 §§ 1-3, 55 Stat. 31.
9. 22 U.S.C. § 271 (1934).
10. See 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 206-10.
11. See A DEcADE OF AMFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY, S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 126, 158 (1950).
12. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 511-14 (1972).
13. Hopson, supra note 1, at 253.
14. E.M. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND EXEcuTi E AGREEMENTS IN THE UnrED STATES
vi (1960) [hereinafter cited as BYRD].
15. Id.
16. Hopson, supra note 1, at 253.
INT'L L.
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17:1. At one time Secretary of State Dulles stated that about 10,000
agreements had been entered into as a result of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization pact alone. He stated that "every time we open a new privy,
we have to have an executive agreement."' 7
Commenting on this situation, with particular reference to executive agreements concluded under the presidents' sole constitutional
powers, Senator J. W. Fulbright stated:
Traditionally that authority [to conclude executive agreements
without Senate advice and consent] was confined to matters of a
a routine or administrative nature, while significant, substantive
matters were thought to require treaties consented to by the Senate.
As matters have developed in recent years, I think it no exaggeration to say that this distinction has been substantially reversed;
matters of a routine, administrative or essentially non-political or
significant nature-an agreement, for example, for the recovery of
lost archaeological objects in Mexico-are regularly submitted to
the Senate most solemnly for its advice and consent. Matters of
weight and substance, on the other hand, such as the stationing of
troops in a foreign country, or the conduct of clandestine warfare
on another government's behalf have in recent years been contracted by secret executive agreement without the consent or even
the knowledge of the Senate. 18
The Effects of Executive Agreements and Treaties:
A Trend Toward Equivalence

How does the preference for executive agreements over treaties as a
tool for the conduct of United States foreign relations affect the operation of government? As far as this country's international obligations are
concerned the binding effect of an executive agreement is the same as
that of a treaty. 9 The distinction between the two instruments is purely a
constitutional one.20 It is only when dealing with the domestic effects of
such obligations that the differences become apparent.
The domestic effect of a treaty is well-established. If either the
proper implementing legislation has been passed, or if the treaty is selfexecuting, "[o]ur Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the
land. It is, consequently, to be regarded. . . as equivalent to an act of
the legislature .... ,,21 As such, a treaty may supersede an act of Con17. Hearing on Si. Res. 1 and SJ. Res. 43 Before Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 877 (1953).
18. Hearingsbefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on S. 596, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1971) (Opening remarks of the chairman).
19. Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Text with comment by the Research
in InternationalLaw of the HarvardLaw School, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 697- 98 (Supp.
1935).
20. Id.

21. Foster v, Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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gress2 2 and may itself be superseded by a subsequent act of Congress.2 8
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 4 insures that
treaties will predominate over state laws in the same manner that a federal statute so predominates. A treaty cannot violate the Constitution,25
but no treaty has been found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. 26 The treaty power is viewed as a substantive one27 in that
it permits dealings with "all subjects arising under the law of nations. 28
Consequently, the 1920 case of Missouri v. Holland2 1 upheld a treaty
executed with Great Britain (acting on behalf of Canada) for the protection of migratory birds, and sustained the federal implementing legislation against an attack based on the Tenth Amendment reservation of
all powers, not enumerated in the Constitution, to the states. 30 The Court
ruled that, because of the substantive nature of the power, a treaty may
deal with powers not delegated to the federal government by the states,
and Congress may enact such laws as are necessary and proper to implement the treaty." The practices of the "founding fathers" are in accord
with this approach, as shown by the fact that treaties passed both before
and after the adoption of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment
involved obligations which infringed on the powers reserved to the
32
states.
The domestic effect of an executive agreement is more difficult to
define since few cases deal with it as a constitutional issue. Until the turn
of the century, there was little support for the proposition that an executive agreement, as the equivalent of a treaty, would become the law of the
land under the supremacy clause.33 B. Altman & Co. v. United States"
22. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
23. The Cherokee Tobacco (Boudinot v. United States), 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616

(1870).
24. 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONST., art.
VI § 2.
25. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
267 (1890); Doe v.Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
26. BYRD,supra note 14, at 86.

27. Id. at 65.
28. Id. at 45.
29. 252 U.S.416 (1920).
30. Id. at 434-35.
31. Id.at433.
32. BYRD,supra note 14, at 79.
33. This was felt to be the result of nonadherence to the treaty process. See, e.g.,
Four Packages of Cut Diamonds v.United States, 256 F. 305, 306 (2d Cir. 1919); 1
W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITrTIONAL LAW OF TkM UNITED STATES 589 (2d ed. 1929);
5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 390 (1943).
34. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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was the first step toward a reversal of that view. In Altman, the United
States Supreme Court held that an international commercial agreement
fell within the ambit of an 1891 statute which established appellate jurisdiction over cases involving treaties, 5 even though the agreement had
not been ratified by the Senate.3 6 The case was a significant step in
establishing an equivalence between treaties and executive agreements.
In 1936, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,37 the
Court held that congressional authorization of an executive agreement
was not an unconstitutional delegation of powers.3 8 Justice Sutherland's
opinion for the majority included dicta which propounded a theory of
inherent power in the federal government to conduct foreign affairs, a
power which was derived wholly apart from the Constitution, as an essential concomitant of sovereignty. 9 Justice Sutherland remarked that
this power was embodied in the president as the "sole organ" of the government in the area of international relations whether or not Congress
made such a delegation.4 ° Justice Sutherland argued that traditionally
the royal sovereign had plenary powers to deal with other nations; that
these powers of external sovereignty passed from the British Crown to
the colonies in their collective capacity as the United States, because they
acted as a unit and not severally, and subsequently were vested in the
president as the chief executive of the nation.4 1
The following year, Justice Sutherland expounded on the theory of
equivalence between treaties and executive agreements, and his own inherent power theory, in United States v. Belmont. 42 In Belmont the Supreme Court upheld an executive agreement, the Litvinov Assignment,
which President F. D. Roosevelt had concluded without any action
on the part of Congress or the Senate.4 3 Justice Sutherland, in the majority opinion, sustained the agreement over contrary New York state
policy. 44 He reasoned that the same rule that establishes the constitutional supremacy of treaties holds supreme "all international compacts and
agreements from the very fact that complete power over international
affairs is in the national government. . . and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several States." 45
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
224 U.S. at 587-88.
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318-20.
Id. at 316-17; see also Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 53, 80-81 (1795).
301 U.S. 324 (1937).

43. Id. at 330.
44. Id. at 331.
45. Id.
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Five years later, Justice Douglas cited Belmont and Curtiss-Wright
in the majority opinion for United States v. Pink.46 Dealing with facts
similar to those found in Belmont, the Court held that:
[Tihe Litvinov Assignment was an international compact which
did not-require the participation of the Senate. . . . Power to reremove such obstacles to full recognition [of the U.S.S.R.] as settlement of claims of our nationals . . .certainly is a modest implied
power of the President who is the "sole organ
'4 of the federal government in the field of international relations.
The Court further held:
A treaty is a "Law of the Land" under the supremacy clause ....
Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assign[S]tate law must yield when it
ment have a similar
dignity. . ..
48
is inconsistent.
Thus, in a period of just thirty years the executive agreement has
moved from a position where it could have no effect on state law, to a
position where its domestic effect is practically equivalent to that of a
treaty. The cases above show that this result is based both on the constitutional requirements of Article VI, and on the inherent power theory
which has no constitutional limitation.
The effect of an executive agreement on federal legislation is even
less certain. It is suggested that in areas where Congress' powers are
concurrent with those of the president, he "might act in external affairs
without congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to an
Act of Congress." 49 Thus, if Congress has yet to deal with a particular
subject in such an area, the president has free rein; if Congress has passed
a law in an area, the president must respect it. A corollary of this view
is that Congress cannot terminate an executive agreement's international obligations if the agreement is based on the president's exclusive powers, unlike a treaty which may be terminated by legislation. The president might argue that such an act would be an unconstitutional invasion
of his power 50 with the ironic result that an executive agreement, which
has little basis in the Constitution, would be "exalted" over a formal
treaty, whose basis is firmly established in Articles H and VI. However,
the Court has yet to rule on this particular issue, and it remains to be
seen if such a result would be sustained.
The executive agreement has become substantially identical to a
formal treaty in both its international and national effects. The limits on
46. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
47. Id. at 229.
48. Id. at 230-31.
49. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
50. McDougal & Lans, supra note 3, at 317.
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this "power" are ill-defined at best. They are determined solely by the
president5 1 and without the checks and balances inherent in the treaty
process. Is this a result that would be countenanced by the authors of the
Constitution?
The Intent of the Founders"
Executive agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution nor
were they specifically considered in the Constitutional Convention or
the Ratification Conventions.5" However, the framers' knowledge of
their existence can be inferred from the broad definition of the treaty
power as used in Article II section 2. Alexander Hamilton stated in one
of his Letters of Camillus:
that it was understood by all to be the intent of the provision to
give that [treaty] power the most ample latitude-to render it
competent to all the stipulations which the exigencies of national
affairs might require; competent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among nations.54
Article 1 section 10 55 provides additional evidence of the founders'
awareness of international agreements other than treaties. It prohibits
the states from entering into treaties, alliances or confederations but permits international agreements or compacts with the consent of Congress.
It may be inferred from this provision that agreements and compacts
were considered inferior to the more politically oriented instruments
(treaties) prohibited to the states. This is confirmed by the limited use
of such instruments just prior to adoption of the Constitution as a means
for regulating boundaries, navigation, fishing rights, etc.5" This same
57
interpretation underlies Senator Fulbright's remarks quoted earlier.
Some authors have argued that since agreements could be considered to be within the Article II grant of the power of the president "by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties," that
the president by implication is given the power to enter into executive
51. Wright, supra note 6, at 349.
52. See generally Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71
MicH. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
53. Id.at 33.
54. 6 A. HAMILTON, Tnn WoRKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 183 (H. Lodge ed.
1904) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as A. AILTONl].
55. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation ....
No
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports ....
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress ... enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
56. Berger, supranote 52, at 42.
57. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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agreements, the lesser instrument. This argument is based on the view
that "advice and consent" merely means that the Senate has the power to
veto or amend a treaty that has been negotiated by the executive.58 The
president's ability to enter into executive agreements would then derive
from his power to negotiate. This is not in accord with the scheme envisioned at the time the Constitution was written. The framers of Article II gave jointly to the president and the Senate the power to make
treaties; their powers were to be coextensive.5 0 In fact, the framers initially adopted the practice of the Continental Congress and granted the
Senate the exclusive power to make treaties. s0 It was not until the debates after August 6, 1787, that Madison stated that "the Senate represented the States alone," and concluded that, "the President should be an
agent [but not the exclusive agent] in Treaties." 1 Not until the closing
days of the Convention was the president included in the treaty process
by a proposal of the Committee of Eleven on September 4, 1787.2
The colonists feared strong executive power, their fear being inspired by their experiences with the English monarchy and the royal
governors. Consequently, the founders introduced the president purely
to provide checks and balances on the Senate power, and to facilitate a
uniform foreign relations policy. 63 James Iredell's remarks at the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention are illustrative of this point. He stated
that:
The power of making treaties is so important that it would have
been highly dangerous to vest it in the Executive alone, and would
have been the subject of much greater clamor. From the nature
of the thing, it could not be vested in the popular representative.
It must therefore have been provided for with the Senate's concurrence . . .or the power, the greatest monarchical power that
can be exercised, must have been vested in a manner that would
have excited universal indignation in the President alone.0 4
The founders assumed that the Senate would participate in the
making of treaties, not just ratification. Charles Pinckney, a delegate to
the convention from South Carolina, stressed that the president could
not "take a single step . . . without [Senate] advice."0 5 IHamilton expressed similar views in the Federalist No. 75:
58. Mathews, The ConstitutionalPower of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE LJ.345, 349 (1955).
59. Berger, supranote 52, at 6.
60. 2 M. FARRAND, Tim REcoRns OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 183

(1911) [hereinafter cited as M. FABlAND].
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 392.
Id. at 498-99.
Id. at 53841.
BYRD, supra note 14, at 25.
4 J.ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE

FEDERAL CONSTrrTiON

SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
ELLIOT].

258 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as J.
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[Tihe vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties
as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them. ...
It
must indeed be clear to a demonstration that joint possession
of the power in question, by the President and the Senate, would
afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession
of it by either of them.6 6
Senate participation was important to the framers for other reasons
as well. The need for a uniform foreign relations policy required that
treaties be made to predominate over state law by the supremacy clause.
This domination would be unacceptable to the states unless they had
some part in the drafting of the treaty. Participation was provided, on an
equal basis, by their representatives in the Senate.67 An executive agreement purporting to be the supreme law of the land, following the view of
Belmont, would not provide this representation for the states. 68 According to the founders, any claim of authority to conclude presidential executive agreements based on the grant of the treaty power can be answered
very simply. Patrick Henry stated, commenting on the treaty power, "the
President, as distinguished from the Senate, is nothing." 69
The founders regarded the power to enter into international agreements with great respect and recognized that it had to be "carefully
guarded; the cooperation of. . . the Senate. .. being required to make
any treaty whatever. ' 70 Further, since the use of the word "treaties" in
Article II is construed broadly to cover "all the stipulations which...
national affairs might require . . and every other species of convention," it follows that Article I1 "covers the field."' 7 ' As such, it becomes
unimportant that "[tihe Constitution does not [expressly] provide that
the treaty-making procedure is to be the exclusive mode. ' 72 The statements of the founders show that the treaty power was intended to be
"carefully guarded" and the exclusive means of making international
agreements. Justice Story reiterated this view over a century after the
adoption of the Constitution when he stated that:
[C]onsidering the delicacy and extent of the power, it is too much
66. THE FEDERALIsT No. 75, 486, 488 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
67. See generally BYRD, supra note 14, ch. 6.
68. Perhaps this would raise a Tenth Amendment problem not yet considered by
the Court. Heretofore, federal laws encroaching on the area of reserved state powers
have been upheld as necessary and proper to implement a treaty. This result was not
intolerable because the states did have some representation, in theory, in the making of
the treaty through their representatives in the Senate. It is submitted that an executive
agreement should not be given the same effect in this area, because of the lack of state
representation.
69. 3 J. ELLIOT, supranote 65, at 353.
70. 6 A. HAMILTON, supranote 54, at 183.
71. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
72. McDougal & Lans, supra note 3 at 216.
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to expect that a free people would confide to a single magistrate,
however respectable, the sole authority to act conclusively, as well
as exclusively, upon the subject of treaties . . . But however
proper it may be in a monarchy, there is no American statesman
but must feel that such a prerogative in an American President
would be inexpedient -and dangerous. It would be inconsistent
with that wholesome jealousy which all republics ought to cherish,
of all depositories of power. .... 78
In spite of the manifest view of the founders to the contrary, some
authors have mentioned that the president may derive the authority to
conclude executive agreements from his constitutionally granted exclusive or independent powers, such as the power to recognize foreign governments, appoint ambassadors, and the power to act as the chief executive and commander-in-chief. 74
The founders' fear of executive power manifested itself in remarks
such as those of Madison when he said it was necessary "to fix the extent
of Executive authority" and added that such power should be confined
and defined. 7 5 Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist No. 69 that
the power of the commander-in-chief "would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and Admiral ..
"..
,76 At least one author has
interpreted this as imparting no other powers to the president than those
possessed by any other high ranking military officer! 7
The
obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed was construed by the founders as granting powers such as "those of the governors,"7 8 which were to execute the laws of the commonwealth and "not,
under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any
law, statute, or custom of England. 7 9 This eliminates any transfer, from
England, of the right to execute agreements by virtue of executive position. Finally, the power to receive ambassadors and recognize foreign
governments was, according to Hamilton, "more a matter of dignity
than of authority . . . . [W]ithout consequence in the administration
of the government ..
"..
,80 Thus, the president!s independent powers
were, in the view of the founders, limited in such a way that the treaty
process of Article II would remain the exclusive procedure for entering
into international agreements.
73. 2 J. STORY,

(Sth ed.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

1891).
McDougal & Lans, supranote 3, at 244-52.
1 M. FARRAND, supra note 60, at 66-67.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, 448 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
E. CORWiN, ThE PPESiENT: OFFIcE AND PowERs 276 (3d ed. 1948).
2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 128.
Berger, supranote 52, at 19 n.96.
Tm FEDERALIST No. 69, 451 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).

341
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Even if the president has no authority to conclude an agreement
without Senate participation under the Constitution, there still remains a
possible basis for such action in Justice Sutherland's dicta in CurtissWright concerning the inherent sovereign powers of the chief executive.8 1 Sutherland's theory, mentioned earlier, is that the president acquired sovereign powers in external affairs directly from England, totally apart from the powers enumerated in the Constitution."' This is based
on a misconception of history in that he argues:
[Tihe states severally never possessed international powers, such
powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers
but obviously were transmitted to the 'United States from some
other source . . . . [Tihe powers of external sovereignty passed
from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies
in -their collective and corporate capacity as the United States
. . . . Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, therefore,
the external sovereignty of Great Britian in respect of the colonies
ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.8 3
The view he expresses was not the view of the colonies as reflected
in various state constitutions and declarations. 84 The Articles of Confederation stated: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power . . . not . . . expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled. 88 In direct opposition to the view
advanced by Justice Sutherland, the states expressly granted Congress
the power to make wars and treaties in Article IX of the Articles of Confederation.8 6 The founders viewed sovereign power as being bestowed
on the government by the people, not the Crown, and as having no existence of itself. Madison said "the people were in fact, the fountain of all
power.
..." As such the government was created by the delegation
of specifically enumerated powers in the Constitution, and nowhere
else:
A supra-constitutional "residuum" of powers not granted expressly
or by necessary implication was not only furthest from their [the
framers] thoughts, but avowal of such a "residuum" would have
affrighted them and barred adoption of the Constitution. 88
Since Justice Sutherland's inherent power doctrine is dictum, unsupported by historical fact and in opposition to the views of the authors
81.
82.
83.
(1795).
84.
85.
1963).
86.
87.
88.

See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
Id.
299 U.S. at 316-17, citing Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 53, 80-81
See Berger, supra note 52, at 28-29.
(Article 11) H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS
Id. at 113.
2 M. FAPAND, supra note 60, at 476.
Berger, supra note 52, at 33.

OF AMERICAN

HITony 111 (7th ed.
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of the Constitution, it should not be regarded as providing a valid basis
for the president to conclude international agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate. 89 Further, it appears that there exists no
constitutional basis for such an agreement concluded solely on the basis
of executive authority. An attempt to conclude such an agreement
would be an attempt to evade the Constitution. Quoting a New York
Times editorial, Edwin Borchard suggested arguing that an executive
agreement does not require Senate participation,
"is merely to argue that we can get around the Constitution by conspiring with each other to call a spade by another name" . . . if
this can be done "we can do away with -the need for any approval
of treaties";
in fact, we can "interpret" the Constitution entirely
o
away.9
In addition to usurping Senate powers, such a process effectively
precludes state or popular participation from the drafting of the agreement. It eliminates their representatives from the decision-making
process, yet it binds individuals and states as the law of the land. This was
a major concern at the time of adoption of the Constitution, and can be
resolved properly only by the participation of a part or the whole of the
legislative body.
Congressional Reactions
Some members of Congress have expressed concern over the
present status of the executive agreement, particularly the potential for
expansion of executive agreements concluded exclusively by the president. From 1952 through 1957 various attempts were made to adopt an
amendment to the Constitution that would prohibit federal interference
in the area of reserved state powers by either treaty or executive agreement. 91 Named the Bricker amendments because their chief proponent
was Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, the attempts were prompted both
by fear that treaties would become superior to the Constitution,9" and by
isolationist sentiment directed at avoiding the United States involvement
in the United Nations. 3 Although there were many versions, the amendments typically provided that:
89. This is especially true in light of later cases with dicta totally opposed to the
inherent powers view. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
604 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
90. Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 38 AM. J. INT'L
L. 637, 639 n.9 (1944).
91. See S.I. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S.J. Res. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955); S. Rep. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1956).
92. BYRD, supra note 14, at 85-86.
93. W. SWINDLER, CoURT AND CONSTITUTIoN IN THE 20 m CENTURY:

LEGALrrY 1932-1968, 224 (1970).
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Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other
agreements with any foreign power or international organization.
All such agreements shall
be subject to the limitations imposed on
94
treaties by this article.
The relevant limiting provisions provided that the treaty or agreement
"shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of the treaty." 95 These
amendments were directed at limiting the Missouri v. Holland" decision, preventing encroachment into the area of reserved state powers.
During the same period, the McCarran Resolution 9 ' attempted to
limit the expansion of executive agreements. It provided that no executive agreement would be of any force or effect until published in the
Federal Register and that all agreements would be subject to federal
legislative veto. 98 This resolution was a direct outgrowth of the increasing number of secret executive agreements being concluded that were
not subject to congressional inquiry. 99
Although neither the Bricker Amendment nor the McCarran Resolution was adopted, 10 0 the recent manifestations of Senate and congressional concern have proven more effective. The National Commitments Resolution passed by the Senate in 1969101 urged the use of
treaties instead of executive agreements in the conduct of foreign relations.
Secrecy again prompted action in 1972 and led to the Case billlZ
which required that all agreements be sent to Congress for information,
and in an addition sponsored by Senator Ervin, permitted congressional
veto of an agreement within sixty days of transmission.10 3 As enacted it
provides:
The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of
any international agreement, other than a treaty . . . as soon as
practicable after such agreement has entered into force . . . but
in no event later than sixty days thereafter. However, any such
agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the
94. S.I. Res. 1 § 3, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
95. Id. § 2.
96. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
97. S.I. Res. 2, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
98. Hopson, supra note 1, at 262.
99. It has been reported that the State Department has declined to reveal over 400
secret agreements, and that there are thousands of others concluded by other agencies
of the government, which have not been disclosed, notably by the Department of Defense. See Berger, supra note 52, at 34 n.191.
100. Hopson, supra note 1, at 263.
101. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
102. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972).
103. Berger, supra note 52, at 3.
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opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of
the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but
shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy .... 104
These provisions are essentially the same as those proposed as a
compromise during the Bricker amendment controversy in 1954 by
Senators Ferguson and Knowland. 10 5 It required seventeen years for the
Congress to pass such a bill, but having done so it recognized that its
action represented "a long first step toward the recovery of that constitutional authority which we [the Congress] have allowed to erode away
over the years."' 0 6 The Case bill provides the needed information for
Congress to "reexamine and then perhaps to reassert its proper con1 07
stitutional authority in the area of treaties."'
Conclusion
That the executive agreement has come to predominate over the
treaty cannot be denied. It is also evident that this subverts the intent of
the founders by evading the participation of the legislative branch in the
treaty process. Under the present laws, Congress is not informed of an
agreement until after it has "entered into force."'' 08 Rather than being
presented with a fait accompli by the executive branch, it is essential that
Congress be given a role in the formation of international agreements
and compacts, if the scheme envisioned in the Constitution is to be reaffirmed.
Informing either the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the
House Foreign Affairs Committee of pending negotiations would provide the needed opportunity for legislative input. This is not to suggest
that Congress must act on every agreement, but merely provides an opportunity for Congress to express its views if it chooses. Agreements of a
routine or administrative nature still may be concluded without specific
congressional enactments"1 9 under general policy statements; yet the
problem of determining which agreements are administrative and
which are substantive, requiring legislative action,"10 would be circumvented. Since the congressional committees would be informed of all
agreements, Congress could act on any individual agreement whenever
it determined that action was necessary.
104.
105.
106.
1st Sess.

1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972).
See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAlS AND THE CONSTrruTIoN 137 (1972).
Hearingsbefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on S. 596, 92d Cong.,
(1971) (Opening remarks of the chairman).

107. Id.
108. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.

110. See text accompanying note 18 supra,
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A procedure such as this would not eliminate the executive agreement as a foreign policy tool, but would adapt it to meet constitutional
requirements. It provides for legislative participation with a minimum
of interference in the executive branch's routine functions and adapts

the constitutional requirements to reflect current needs.
Although the Case bill was a beginning, more involvement of the
legislative branch is needed. Congress should actively seek to reclaim the
authority which it has allowed to erode away over the years.111
111. Since this note was written four bills have been proposed, by Senators Bentsen,
Case, Glenn and Representative Morgan, which would permit the legislative veto of
executive agreements. The proposals differ as to whether all agreements should be
submitted to Congress, or just those entered into without specific prior authorization;
and as to whether the Senate, the House, or both should review the agreements. However, each of the bills proposes some means by which Congress may veto an executive
agreement submitted to it within sixty days, and before the agreement takes effect. The
Nixon administration was able to defeat the Ervin proposal for a legislative veto of
executive agreements, mentioned in the text accompanying note 103 supra, in 1972 and
also when it was reintroduced in 1973 and 1974. In light of the reaction to events
such as the Nixon-Thieu letter promising U.S. support to counter violations of the
Vietnam Peace Accords, and the 1972 trade agreement with the Soviet Union which
was later repudiated, it remains to be seen if the Ford administration's proposals for
informal cooperation and its opposition to these bills will be sufficient to prevent their
passage. See 33 CoNG. QuARTERLY WEKLY REPORT 1712 (1975).

